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Are randomized controlled trials positivist? Reviewing the social science and philosophy literature 
to assess positivist tendencies of trials of social interventions in public health and health services 
 
Abstract 
Background 
We have previously proposed that trials of social interventions can be done within a ‘realist’ 
research paradigm. Critics have countered that such trials are irredeemably positivist and asked us 
to explain our philosophical position.  
Methods  
We set out to explore what is meant by positivism and whether trials adhere to its tenets (of 
necessity or in practice) via a narrative literature review of social science and philosophical 
discussions  of positivism, and of the trials literature and three case studies of trials. 
Results 
The philosophical literature described positivism as asserting: 1) the epistemic primacy of sensory 
information; 2) the requirement that theoretical terms equate with empirical terms; 3) the aim of 
developing universal laws; and 4) the unity of method between natural and social sciences. 
Regarding 1), it seems that rather than embodying the epistemic primacy of sensory data, RCTs of 
social interventions in health embrace an anti-positivist approach aiming to test hypotheses derived 
deductively from prior theory. Considering 2), while some RCTs of social interventions appear to 
limit theorization to concepts with empirical analogues, others examine interventions underpinned 
by theories engaging with mechanisms and contextual contingencies not all of which can be 
measured. Regarding 3), while some trialists and reviewers in the health field do limit their role to 
estimating statistical trends as a mechanistic form of generalization, this is not an inevitable feature 
of RCT-based research. Trials of social interventions can instead aim to generalize at the level of 
theory which specifies how mechanisms are contingent on context. In terms of 4), while RCTs are 
used to examine biomedical as well as social interventions in health, RCTs of social interventions are 
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often distinctive in using qualitative analyses of data on participant accounts to examine questions 
of meaning and agency not pursued in the natural sciences.  
Conclusion 
We conclude that the most appropriate paradigm for RCTs of social interventions is realism not 
positivism.  
Keywords: Randomized controlled trials, Positivism, Realism 
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Are randomized controlled trials positivist? Reviewing the social science and philosophy literature 
to assess positivist tendencies of trials of social interventions in public health and health services 
 
Background 
 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have been used for many decades to evaluate not only 
biomedical interventions but also social interventions in fields such as public health, health services, 
economics and education.[1-4] RCTs are used to generate some of the evidence intended to inform 
evidence-based practice and policy. Evidence-based policy has a long intellectual history in which 
authors such as Donald Campbell and Karl Popper have argued that social science experiments 
should provide evidence to inform and assess ‘piecemeal social engineering’.[5, 6] This process 
involves incremental changes to public policy, which are evaluated to assess whether they have 
achieved their intended objectives and whether there have been any unintended harmful 
consequences. But in fields such as public health and health services, evidence-based policy, and in 
particular the use of RCTs, has attracted criticism in terms of its ontological (i.e. concerning the 
nature of reality) and epistemological (i.e. concerning how we know about reality) assumptions. 
These are said to situate RCTs firmly within a ‘positivist’ paradigm.[7-11] We will explore later what 
is meant by positivism. 
 
We have previously proposed that RCTs can contribute to ‘realist’ evaluation of social interventions 
in public health or health services.[12] Realist evaluators argue that rather than merely examining 
‘what works’, evaluations should examine what works, for whom and under what conditions.[13] 
Informed by critical realist philosophy,[14] they suggest that social interventions do not produce 
outcomes directly but rather that interventions introduce new resources into social settings (or 
redistribute or displace existing resources). Local actors might then draw on these resources to enact 
local actions which may then in turn trigger mechanisms that generate the intended and 
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unintended, ‘outcomes’ of the intervention. Realist evaluators propose that the focus of evaluation 
should be on these mechanisms which may play out differently in different contexts to generate 
different outcomes.  
 
Critical realists further suggest that we can think of the world in terms of: an ‘empirical’ realm 
consisting of experience; an ‘actual’ realm of occurrences whether or not these are observed; and a 
‘real’ realm consisting of unobservable causal mechanisms that generate events in the actual realm. 
Realists argue against understanding causality merely in terms of observed ‘constant conjunctions’ 
of causes and effects. They argue that causal mechanisms are tendencies and whether effects are 
generated depends on other factors. Mechanisms may be triggered but cancelled out by other 
mechanisms or may not be triggered at all depending on local circumstances. Therefore, a lack of 
‘constant conjunction’ does not necessarily mean that our theories about mechanisms are 
wrong.[15, 16] Instead of evaluations focusing principally on estimating overall associations between 
allocation or exposure to an intervention and measures of outcome (i.e. effect sizes), realist 
evaluations aim to develop and test hypotheses concerning context-mechanism-outcome 
configurations.[13] 
 
We have previously suggested that RCTs and systematic reviews of RCTs could contribute to a realist 
approach to the evaluation of social interventions by focusing not merely on overall effect sizes but 
also by building and testing hypotheses about context-mechanism-outcome configurations. We have 
suggested that the plausibility of context-mechanism-outcome hypotheses could be examined by 
assessing whether these are borne out by ‘data signatures’ from trials. Within a single RCT, 
moderator analyses might examine how outcomes vary between subgroups of sites, clusters or 
individuals defined by varying contextual factors. Within a systematic review, meta-regressions 
might explore how study-level effect sizes are moderated by context. The aspect of context in 
question (for example, whether the setting was urban, suburban or rural) need to be measured in a 
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comparable way across trials or such information needs to be available from other sources available 
to the reviewer.  
 
However, these proposals have been criticized by some realist evaluators, who argue that RCTs are 
irredeemably positivist and therefore inimical to realist enquiry.[8] Our realist critics have requested 
that we discuss our views concerning whether RCTs are positivist:[8] 
 
“Bonell et al… indicate that they do not necessarily agree that RCTs are based on a positivist 
ontological and epistemological foundation, but they opt not to discuss this further… This is 
a pity, because … it is the ontological position and its epistemological consequences that 
limit the usefulness of RCTs when applied to complex interventions.” (p. 125) 
 
We agree that it would be useful for us to address this question of whether or not trials are 
positivist. RCTs are often described as being positivist by social scientists and this view may be an 
important barrier to harnessing realist approaches to improve the conduct of trials of social 
interventions in public health and health services, and enabling deeper collaborations between 
trialists and social scientists.  
 
Methods 
 
The paper does not aim to repeat all our previous arguments in favour of realist RCTs but instead 
aims to focus on the question of what positivism means and whether RCTs are of necessity or in 
practice positivist. We first examined how the term positivism has been used in the social science 
literature in the fields of health and education that describes or criticizes RCTs as positivist. We then 
explored how positivism has been defined in the wider literature on the philosophy of science. The 
paper then goes on to consider whether public health and health services research RCTs appear to 
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embody the various tenets of positivism, and whether this is a necessary or contingent feature. In 
doing so we refer to three exemplar trials of school-based health interventions (see box 1).  
 
Child Development Program (CDP) RCT[17-20] 
 
Timing: 1982-89 
Setting and sample: Three elementary schools in the intervention group and three elementary 
schools in the control group, in northern California.  
Intervention: This aimed to “encourage pro-social behaviour by providing children with several 
types of experience which serve to engender a sense of community and a climate of mutual 
respect and concern in the classroom and school.”[17] (p.149) Activities included cooperative 
learning, and involvement of children in rule setting, discussions and helping activities.  
Outcome evaluation: This reported positive intervention effects on interview-assessed cognitive 
problem-solving and conflict resolution skills, increased questionnaire-reported peer acceptance, 
reduced loneliness and anxiety, and increased observer-rated prosocial behaviours. There were 
no effects on questionnaire-reported measures of self-esteem, liking of school, perceived social 
competence or popularity. 
Process evaluation: Observations indicated that intervention classrooms were more likely to use 
strategies promoted by the intervention, particular where teachers were rated as of high 
competence. 
Rationale for including as an example: This RCT is quite old and did not employ any qualitative 
research despite focusing on a social intervention. It is therefore a good case study to assess 
whether in practice some trials might be positivist in approach.  
 
A Stop Smoking in Schools Trial (ASSIST) RCT[21-23] 
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Timing: 2001-4 
Setting and sample: Twenty-nine secondary schools allocated to intervention and 30 to be 
controls in western England and south-east Wales. 
Intervention: Secondary school-based peer education outside classrooms focused on smoking 
prevention. 
Outcome evaluation: This reported a reduction in the prevalence of smoking in the past week 
overall and among those who had smoked at baseline. 
Process evaluation: Quantitative and qualitative research found that teachers generally 
supported the intervention despite concerns about some aspects such as the possibility that 
students might nominate some individuals as peer educators who teachers did not see as good 
representatives of the school. The evaluation found that peer educators themselves tended to 
focus messages on information more than persuasion and primarily targeted non-smoking friends. 
Rationale for including as an example: This was a trial led by one of the authors of this paper 
(Initials withheld for blind-reviewing) which though not explicitly realist or anti-positivist in 
orientation, nonetheless focused on questions of how, for whom and under what circumstances 
the intervention worked. It therefore offers a promising case study to assess whether or not in 
practice a modern trial of a social intervention has positivist tendencies. 
 
Initiating change locally in bullying and aggression through the school environment (INCLUSIVE) 
RCT[24-26] 
 
Timing: 2014-17 
Setting and sample: Twenty secondary schools in the intervention group and 20 secondary 
schools in the control group, all in south-eastern England. 
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Intervention: A whole-school intervention to reduce bullying, aggression via: training staff in 
restorative practice; provision of local data and a facilitator to enable local needs-led decisions 
involving staff and students; and a social and emotional learning curriculum. 
Outcome evaluation: This evaluated effects on student questionnaire-reported bullying and 
aggression (primary outcomes) plus secondary outcomes including student substance use, mental 
and sexual health, and quality of life as well as staff attendance, quality of life and burnout. 
Process evaluation: Ongoing quantitative and qualitative research on intervention 
implementation, reach, acceptability and mechanisms, and how these varied by context. 
Rationale for including as an example: This was a trial involving some of the authors of this paper 
(Initials withheld for blind-reviewing) and was explicitly realist and anti-positivist in orientation. It 
is therefore a good case study to assess whether trials can avoid the various tenets of positivism, 
or whether this is unavoidable. 
 
Results 
 
What is positivism?  
 
Social science references to RCTs as a positivist design 
 
RCTs are frequently described by social scientists working in the fields of health and education as 
positivist. Some of this literature is descriptive and some critical. A good example of the former is 
Green and Thorogood[7] who described RCTs thus: 
 
“the ‘classic’ design of the positivist tradition, as it sets up a study capable of answering a 
question about cause and effect.” (p. 34)  
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Green and Thorogood identified several features of positivism: 
 
“[positivism] assumes that there is a stable reality out there… human understandings may be 
flawed … but there is a potential ‘right’ explanation that we are getting closer to as 
understanding of health and disease increases… There is a stress on empiricism, or studying 
only observable phenomena…, a unity of method, the idea that eventually, when mature, all 
sciences will share the same methods of enquiry. At this point of maturity, the proper object 
of scientific inquiry is the establishment of relationships of cause and effect and the 
generation of laws about the natural world. That many of the social sciences focus on other 
questions is, in this view, evidence of their immaturity.” (p.12, italics as published) 
 
Authors who criticize RCTs as positivist tend to offer less comprehensive definitions than above of 
what they mean by positivism, the term sometimes being used pejoratively and vaguely. The 
originators of realist evaluation[13] themselves acknowledged this tendency: 
 
“Experimental evaluation has struggled because of a basically ‘positivist’ understanding of 
the nature of social causation. We hesitate to put it like this, since the term ‘positivism’ 
these days has been reduced to a crude term of abuse. It is used as an evil totem by those 
intent on musing about there being no place for scientism in understanding the rich, 
meaningful, emotional world of human intercourse.” (p.30) 
 
What features of RCTs are presented as positivist then in these critical accounts? Rowe and Oltmann 
[10] suggested RCTs are positivist because they aim to produce objective knowledge including about 
causality and, in doing so, aim to test hypotheses: 
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“The evidence upon which EBP [evidence based practice] is premised is usually derived from 
experimental research conducted in professional disciplines that are firmly rooted in the 
positivist paradigm; the research method most closely associated with this is the randomised 
controlled trial (RCT). RCTs are quantitative, controlled experiments in which the effect of an 
intervention can be determined more objectively than by observational studies… It seems 
clear that those who most strongly advocate the use of RCTs in education have an inherent 
bias against other methods of data collection, strongly positioning themselves within a 
positivist interpretation of reality…Positivist research maintains that knowledge is objective, 
that it involves hypothesis testing and identifies causality.” (p.6-7) 
 
We will explore whether this quest for objective knowledge and focus on causality, is viewed as a 
distinguishing feature of positivism in the philosophical literature.  
 
The argument that hypothesis testing implies a positivist approach has been made not only by Rowe 
and Oltmann[10] but also by Tones and Green,[11] who similarly labelled RCTs as positivist and 
suggested that trials take what they describe as a ‘hypothetico-deductive approach’ to generating 
scientific knowledge (p. 310). As we shall see in the next section, the philosophy of science literature 
takes a very different view about positivism and the hypothetico-deductive approach. 
 
Other critics have focused on different aspects of what they see as RCTs’ positivist approach. For 
example, Pearce and Raman,[9] in their critique of the positivistic application of RCTs to informing 
public policy, focused on positivism aiming to develop generalizable conclusions devoid of context: 
 
“When RCTs are presented as offering generalizable evidence of what works, the conditions 
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and assumptions built into their doing and interpretation are erased from the story... The 
wider context in which an intervention works is ignored, and it is implied that success in one 
context can simply be transferred to another.” (p. 35) 
 
This concern with generalizable knowledge and whether it implies a lack of concern with context is 
something that we will return to in the next section. 
 
In their own critique of RCTs, the realist evaluators Marchal et al[8] (p. 125) focused on positivism as 
involving a concern with observable phenomena without considering the ways in which causation 
actually operates. They described RCTs as being: 
 
“built upon objectivist (or ‘positivist’) assumptions, which hold that causality cannot be 
observed and that the best we can do is to demonstrate regularity between a particular 
intervention and a particular outcome” 
 
This point will be considered further under point 2 of the next section.  
 
Taken together, these descriptive and critical accounts of trials as positivist enable us to start to 
develop a sense of what positivism is and why RCTs might be viewed as a positivist strategy of 
research. But to get a more systematic sense of what are the distinguishing tenets of positivism, we 
need to examine how positivism has been defined in the wider literature on the philosophy of 
science.  
 
Descriptions of positivism in the philosophy of science literature 
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The philosophical literature has described positivism’s long history and multiple schools ranging 
across different academic disciplines.[19-21]. This literature has systematically mapped out several 
key tenets concerning how positivist social enquiry should proceed, some but not all of which also 
appear in the trials literature reviewed above.[16, 27, 28] 
 
1. The epistemic primacy of direct sensory information as the basis for scientific knowledge 
 
The philosophical literature has not identified objectivity as a distinguishing feature of positivism. 
Philosophers hold that positivism implies a belief not merely in a stable reality that exists 
independently of our senses (which critical realists also accept), but that knowledge of this world 
must derive entirely from our senses. In describing positivism, Blaikie[16] suggested: 
 
“That which is to count as knowledge must be based on experience, on what an observer 
can perceive by his or her senses…, it must be ‘pure experience’ with an empty 
consciousness” (p. 14).  
 
This view suggests that both our informal knowledge as individuals and our more formal theories as 
social scientists about how phenomena relate to one another can be derived directly from sensory 
information. This view has its roots in the ‘empiricist’ philosophy, for example of John Locke, which 
regarded the mind as a ‘blank slate’ upon which knowledge is written, purely by the actions of 
generic logical mental processes applied to information from the senses.[29] The philosophy 
literature offers clarity on this point whereas the social science literature on trials did not. Although 
Green and Thorogood correctly suggested that positivism is based on an empiricist approach to 
knowledge,[7] Tones and Green as well as Rowe and Oltmann suggested incorrectly that positivist 
embrace a hypothetico-deductive approach to producing knowledge.[10, 11] How RCTs actually 
engage with these questions will be explored later in this paper. 
14 
 
 
2. The requirement that theoretical terms must equate with empirical terms 
 
Blaikie argued that positivism holds that, to be meaningful, theoretical concepts must be able to be 
translated directly into empirically measurable elements. Thus, it is not merely that positivists focus 
on questions of cause and effect (indeed, realists also clearly focus on such questions) but rather 
that positivists believe that research should examine causal links between observable phenomena 
rather than speculating about underlying, unobservable mechanisms that might generate such 
causal links.[16] This echoes the argument made by Marchal et al that RCTs are positivist because 
they do this.[8] Whether they do or not in practice will be considered later in this paper. 
 
3. The aim of developing universally applicable laws 
 
For positivists, the aim of both natural sciences, such as biology, chemistry and physics, and social 
sciences, such as sociology, is to produce laws that apply universally, a point raised above in relation 
to RCTs by Green and Thorogood,[7] and Pearce and Ramen.[9] Blaikie[16] suggested that for 
positivists: “laws summarise observations by specifying simple relations or constant conjunctions 
between phenomena” (p. 15). Hacking[27] argued that positivists advocate that science should 
understand causality not as a thing in itself but solely in terms of the constant conjunctions of 
observable phenomena. Bhaskar[14] wrote: 
 
“Positivism pivots on the … theory of constant conjunctions of atomistic events or states of 
affairs, interpreted as the objects of actual or possible experience.” (p. 158).  
 
However, there is no suggestion in this literature that the development of general laws implies a lack 
of interest in contextual contingencies. Later in the paper, we will explore how Karl Popper argued 
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that science, including social science, should concern itself with developing general laws of cause 
and effect but that these should include within them consideration of how contextual contingencies 
will influence causation. Later in this paper, we will explore how our case study RCTs address 
questions of general conclusions. 
 
4. A unity of method between the natural and social sciences 
 
This unity of method, referred to above by Green and Thorogood,[7] concerns the overall approach 
to doing science: the exclusive focus on identifying regularities using researcher-controlled 
experiments. It does not refer to the specific methods that each branch of science uses because 
these will vary depending on the phenomena under investigation. This goal of a unified approach 
contrasts with the view that the social sciences need a totally different approach to the natural 
sciences because the ‘objects’ of social scientific enquiry are quite different not natural phenomena, 
such as atoms and antelopes. Humans are themselves subjects who have their own interpretations 
of the world and engage in willed, meaningful action. The classic anti-positivistic approach to social 
science is exemplified in the hermeneutic tradition of Max Weber which aims to interpret and 
understand, rather than predict, action based on the meanings conferred on it and the agency 
underpinning it on the part of social actors.[30] We shall explore later whether trials of social 
interventions in the health sector take an exclusively natural science approach or whether they 
engage with more Weberian approaches. 
 
Drawing on the philosophy literature, we have identified a systematic set of tenets that should 
distinguish a positivist approach to research. The next section examines whether RCTs conducted in 
the field of public health and health services actually embody these tenets and, if so, whether this is 
a necessary or merely a contingent feature. We make these assessments based on a review of RCT 
16 
 
research in public health and health services, and in particular of the RCTs of school-based health 
interventions described earlier. 
 
Are randomised trials of social interventions in health positivist? 
 
Do trials give primacy to sensory information in building knowledge? 
 
There is no evidence that those undertaking RCTs of social interventions in health assume that all 
knowledge is derived from sensory experience. Medical Research Council guidance for RCTs of 
complex interventions has highlighted the importance of developing coherent and explicit theory of 
intervention mechanisms prior to, not as a result of, evaluation.[1]  
 
The hypotheses that RCTs test certainly appear to be derived deductively from prior theories of 
change, whether or not these are explicitly stated. For example, even in the case of our apparently 
positivist RCT of the CDP intervention, where there was no formal theory of change for the 
intervention, the trial reports did nonetheless discuss the mechanisms by which the intervention 
was intended to work, grounded in descriptions of previous theory and empirical research.[18] The 
research reports located the outcomes to be examined in terms of gaps in previous literature and of 
theory on children’s pro-social development. These were not worded as formal hypotheses but as 
expectations.[17] The ASSIST RCT prospectively identified a primary outcome of recent smoking and 
was explicitly informed by theory concerning the diffusion of prevention messages within a school 
social network. The INCLUSIVE RCT explicitly aimed to test hypotheses derived from a sociological 
theory of change concerning how changes to the school environment might promote student 
engagement and health.[25, 31, 32]  
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Tones and Green rightly cite Karl Popper as making the case for science proceeding via the empirical 
testing of hypotheses derived deductively from theory but incorrectly view this as a positivist 
strategy. In fact, Popper argued for the hypothetico-deductive approach as an alternative to the 
naïve inductive empiricism of positivism. Popper himself was very clear that theories should direct 
empirical social research rather than being inductively built from it:[6] 
 
“The fact that I have discussed the problem of social experiments before discussing … the 
problem of sociological … theories … does not mean that I think observation and 
experiments are … logically prior to theories. On the contrary I believe that theories are prior 
to observations as well as experiments, in the sense that the latter are significant only in 
relation to theoretical problems.” (p. 89-90) 
 
“[I]n the social sciences it is even more obvious than in the natural sciences that we cannot 
see and observe our objects before we have thoughts about them. For most of the objects 
of social science, if not all of them, are abstract objects: they are theoretical constructions.” 
(p.125) 
 
Popper’s approach was a ‘post-positivist’ one of ontological realism, accepting that a world exists 
independent of our senses but avoiding the naïve empiricism which saw human knowledge being 
constructed only from sensory information. Popper recommended the pursuit of objective truth but 
the recognition that this can only occur via attempts to test our cognitively derived theories. 
Theories will influence the questions we ask, what is observed and how it will be measured.  
 
Do trials require that theoretical concepts must translate into empirical measures? 
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Most RCTs performed in the fields of public health and health services research focus on statistical 
measures of the association between quantitative measures of allocation or exposure to 
interventions and quantitative measures of health or risk states.[1, 2] This does appear at first to 
suggest a positivist approach in that understandings of cause and effect is apparently reduced to 
knowledge of constant conjunctions between empirical measures. However, such an approach is not 
particular to RCT research. Furthermore, in using statistics to estimate associations between 
interventions and outcomes, trialists are not searching for constant conjunctions. Indeed, an 
assumption that different individuals allocated to the same interventions will report different 
outcomes (i.e. that interventions and outcomes are not constantly conjoined) is built into trial 
statistics. An odds ratio, for example, presents the relative odds of a particular outcome in a group of 
individuals allocated to an intervention compared to a group of individuals not thus exposed. If 
intervention and outcome were constantly conjoined (i.e. if every single individual exposed to the 
intervention were to experience the same outcome), the odds ratio would be infinity. A focus on 
aggregate effects therefore does not imply that a trialist is thinking of cause and effect in terms of 
simple constant conjunctions. Rather, it is an attempt to estimate the extent to which the net effect 
of an intervention on an overall population for a particular outcome would be harmful or beneficial 
if widely used instead of, or in addition to, usual practice.  
 
We would argue that while this statistical estimate of overall harms and benefits should not be the 
only information on causality that RCTs provide, it is nevertheless valid and useful question for 
informing decisions. A primary focus on whole-population effects is appropriate for example when 
considering the effects of public health interventions informed by the Rose hypothesis since here the 
focus is on population-wide and not sub-group effects.[33] For example, the ASSIST RCT reported an 
overall effect of the intervention in reducing smoking, not because the authors believed the 
intervention would have the same effect on every individual or in every school but because in 
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judging the success of public health interventions, it is important to estimate the potential of the 
intervention to contribute towards population-level reductions in risk:[21]  
 
“…if implemented on a UK-wide basis [ASSIST] could potentially reduce the number of 14–
15-year-old school students taking up regular smoking by 43,289” (p.1601) 
 
This brings us to consider how interested are trialists in understanding causality beyond statistical 
associations of interventions and outcomes. It must be acknowledged that many trials have been 
conducted which have not theorised or empirically examined the intervening mechanisms or 
impacts that connect an intervention and its endpoints.[34] Even where RCTs do include a theory of 
change, in many cases this is little more than a string of empirical measures with arrows denoting 
lines of causation from intervention to mediating factors to proximal and distal outcomes, which is 
then sometimes empirically tested using mediation analyses.[34] Such theories rarely describe the 
real mechanisms that underlie causation and generate outcomes, or how causal such mechanisms 
might play out variably in different contexts.[35]. Analyses of mediation simply add links to the “if x 
then y” thinking commonly attributed to RCTs.[36] In this sense, perhaps many RCTs have, as 
Marchal et al suggest, restricted themselves to identifying conjunctions between observable 
phenomena and have only engaged with theoretical concepts where these have empirical 
analogues.  
 
However, this tendency is not universal. In the case of the ASSIST RCT, which did not explicitly 
embrace realist approaches, the use of statistical data as part of a hypothetico-deductive approach 
within trials did not preclude using other forms of evidence to assess the plausibility of theories 
about mechanisms. The embedded process evaluation drew on a range of data including qualitative 
research on teachers’ and students’ accounts of their own observations about how implementation 
processes occur and how outcomes might be generated.[22, 23] In the explicitly realist INCLUSIVE 
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RCT, the intervention theory of change centred on how the intervention might enable an erosion of 
‘boundaries’ between staff and students as well as between students’ academic and broader 
learning, which then encourages more students to exert agency to commit to school and avoid 
engaging in risk behaviours such as violence that function as symbolic markers of anti-school 
identity. The theory thus included elements that were not open to quantitative measurement but 
which were nonetheless included in the theory of change to give a fuller account of the way in which 
the intervention was intended to work. Such work clearly does not fit with a positivist focus only on 
constant conjunctions, and will be considered in more detail below in our consideration of whether 
RCTs necessarily imply a unity of method. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that it is not only RCTs that shed light on causality partly using statistical 
analyses of overall associations between exposure to interventions and outcomes. For example, the 
originators of realist evaluation positively cited an evaluation of the effect of prisoner education on 
reoffending rates, where the analysis compared rates of recidivism between the intervention group 
and a non-randomised historical comparison group made up of a cohort of individuals imprisoned 
prior to implementation of the intervention.[13] It is not clear why using statistical association data 
from randomised experiments as one way to assess the plausibility of causal mechanisms should be 
considered positivist whereas drawing on evidence of statistical associations from natural 
experiments is not.  
 
Do trials aim to produce universally applicable laws? 
 
A central feature of positivism lies in its attempt to identify law-like regularities. Indeed Marchal et al 
argued that RCTs are underpinned by Humean notions of constant conjunction, directed toward 
identifying interventions that are essentially linked to particular outcomes. We disagree that this is a 
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necessary feature of trials and think that current practices among trialists instead suggest a mixed, 
and arguably inconsistent, set of beliefs. 
 
As discussed above, trialists do not have an expectation of identifying constant conjunctions and 
hence universally applicable laws at the level of the individual. No-one who understands trial 
statistics could possibly believe that any intervention is expected by trialists to produce the same 
effects in different people. Furthermore, nearly all trial reports draw attention to the uncertain 
generalizability of RCT evidence across groups of individuals. Guidance for undertaking health 
RCTs[37] explicitly has acknowledged that results from a trial may be an uncertain guide to wider 
effects: 
 
“External validity is a matter of judgment and depends on the characteristics of the 
participants included in the trial, the trial setting, the treatment regimens tested, and the out-
comes assessed.” (p. 20-21) 
 
Furthermore, when social interventions in public health or health services are transported from one 
setting or population to another, they are commonly subjected to a new RCT in the new situation 
prior to wider use. This suggests that those involved accept that evidence of effect in one context 
cannot unproblematically be accepted as evidence that the intervention will work in the same way in 
a new time and place. The Family Nurse Partnership demonstrated benefits when evaluated in the 
USA, but in England had no effect on smoking cessation, birthweight, rates of second pregnancies, 
and emergency hospital visits for the child.[38, 39]  
 
It is also instructive to explore how systematic reviews approach the question of generalizability 
because such reviews bring together evidence from different settings. That systematic reviewers 
also are aware of the far from unproblematic generalizability of trial evidence is evidenced by their 
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common practice of defining a priori inclusion criteria for reviews not only in terms of interventions 
and evaluation methods but also in terms of the populations and settings involved in studies.[40] 
Assessment tools used by systematic reviewers include judgements of issues such as “directness”, 
which refers to the extent to which the evidence within the review provides evidence of direct or 
indirect relevance to the context of interest.[41] 
 
However, we acknowledge that the picture is mixed regarding whether those doing and synthesizing 
RCTs believe their results to be relevant universally or only context-specifically. Many RCTs have 
confined themselves to examining overall effects and have not explored how these effects are 
moderated by the characteristics of individuals receiving the intervention or settings in which the 
intervention is delivered. In the case of our most potentially positivist RCT case study, that of the 
CDP intervention, the trial assessed the intervention in terms of its overall effects, finding evidence 
of various benefits including students being more accepting of other students, less lonely or anxious, 
with increased problem-solving and resolution skills and prosocial behaviours.[17-20] The research 
did not examine how outcomes varied other than by age[17, 18] not even assessing whether effects 
varied by sex other than in the case of one outcome measure of between-sex friendship 
nominations by sex.[19] The trial reports did not explicitly claim that the intervention would be 
effective in all populations and settings but did consider the implications of the trial results for 
theories of child prosocial development in a way that implies an assumption that the results were 
generalisable.[17, 18] The only reference to context was in the discussion of one paper[17] where 
there was reference to the intervention being effective despite being delivered in schools in 
middle/upper class neighbourhoods where children may “not have exceptional problems with peer 
relations”. (p.166) However, in the case of the more recent and much less positivistically inclined 
ASSIST RCT, as we have seen above, despite estimating the potential population impact of the 
intervention were it to be scaled up, the authors also reported how intervention effects might have 
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varied for example with the structure of local communities, acknowledging that RCT results are not 
mechanistically generalizable across populations.[21]  
 
The way that many systematic reviews are conducted does suggest that their authors expect 
interventions to have broadly similar effects across quite widely differing populations and settings. 
Most systematic reviews of social interventions in the fields of public health and health services, 
such as those done within the Cochrane Collaboration, have as their main focus general questions 
such as ‘do health promoting schools interventions promote children and young people’s 
health?’.[42] In such cases, although the research question defines a specific population (such as 
children and young people) and a specific setting (such as schools), there is often a wide diversity 
within these populations and settings. Even when their research questions refer to more specific 
populations or settings these are usually broad in scope, such as students in schools in low-income 
countries.[43] Such questions do not refer to the detail of contextual contingencies as realist 
evaluators would understand them. Systematic reviews often pool effect estimates from studies 
conducted across these defined but diverse populations and settings and use fixed effect models[44] 
implying the assumption that the pattern of cause and effect is the same across studies, with any 
differences in effect sizes being largely the result of chance. Evidence that this assumption might be 
unwarranted comes from recent research that has demonstrated that systematic reviews of 
complex interventions rarely provide a high level of certainty in effect estimates of complex 
interventions, in large part due to high levels of heterogeneity in effects.[45] Thus, we acknowledge 
that the current picture is mixed, with many systematic reviews in particular acknowledging that 
generalizability is uncertain but proceeding as though it isn’t.  
 
However, this does not mean that this is the only or the best use of RCTs. A more productive 
alternative was obliquely suggested in the work of Karl Popper, one of the original key influences on 
evidence-based policy and an opponent of positivism, in his critique of ‘historicist’ social science. By 
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historicism, Popper was referring to theorists such as Hegel and Marx,[46] who aimed to develop 
general laws explaining the historical evolution of society and thus to predict future developments. 
Popper argued that such theories focus superficially on trends and mistake these for laws of general 
determination: 
 
“[historicists] overlook the dependence of trends on initial conditions. They operate with 
trends as if they were unconditional, like laws. Their confusion of laws with trends makes 
them believe in trends which are unconditional (and therefore general)” (p. 118) 
 
Although the subject matter is very different, precisely the same criticism could be applied to how 
information on statistical trends from RCTs is often currently mistaken for laws of generalisation. 
Systematic reviews as they are generally conducted try to identify overall statistical trends, often 
failing to do so because findings are heterogeneous.[13] But even when they do find consistent 
evidence of effect sizes,[47] this is not an adequate form of generalization because, like the 
historicists cited by Popper, statistical trends alone say nothing about the contextual contingencies 
which are likely to affect whether similar trends might be expected in other populations, times and 
places. 
 
Popper argued instead that social science should aim to identify general mechanisms of causation 
but should theorise and then explore empirically how the consequences of these will be influenced 
by contextual contingencies. He was also clear that ultimately all such generalisations will be quite 
tentative because they are limited by the potential of humans to make their own decisions. From a 
thinker sometimes mistaken for a positivist,[11] this is a remarkably similar approach to the realist 
focus on generative mechanisms and context-mechanism-outcome configurations. As Popper 
argued, while generalizations from social science will always be less definite than those from natural 
science because of human agency, the use of theories that include contextual contingencies has the 
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potential to enable social scientists to develop more informed and more precisely worded forms of 
generalization.  
 
The INCLUSIVE RCT examined such questions. It focused on testing various a priori hypotheses about 
context-mechanism-outcome configurations informed by theory, such as whether intervention 
effects were greater in schools with more socioeconomically disadvantaged students (because the 
theory of change suggests that boundary erosion will have more impact on the engagement and 
hence the health outcomes of such students). It also drew on qualitative data collected as part of the 
process evaluation to develop new configurations, to be tested in post hoc analyses where pertinent 
quantitative allow. Because it was a pragmatic effectiveness trial of how the intervention worked in 
a group of schools under real-world conditions, the INCLUSIVE trial should have included sufficient 
diversity in terms of intervention delivery as well as of school settings and populations to examine a 
range of context-mechanism-outcome configurations.[26] Similarly, although not explicitly realist in 
its aims, the ASSIST RCT aimed to identify factors external to the intervention which might affect its 
implementation and effectiveness.[48] Trial papers hypothesized how outcomes might vary by 
context on the basis of its theory and confirmed this to be the case in statistical analysis: 
 
“Interventions for health promotion based on diffusing new behavioural norms might work 
best in clearly defined, fairly close-knit communities, such as those assumed to exist in the 
ex-coalfield communities of the Welsh valleys, since peer supporters are in very regular 
contact with members of a community whose membership is well defined and stable. 
Analysis showed this notion to be true, with a substantially greater effect in students from 
valley schools than in those from other areas.” [21](pp. 1599-1600) 
 
Any single study will lack the statistical power and heterogeneity of context to explore every single 
context-mechanism-outcome configuration but there is no reason why this is more the case in 
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experimental than quasi-experimental or before-and-after research. The extent to which every 
individual study should attempt to investigate all potential mechanisms and contextual 
contingencies is also highly questionable. Some analyses of how mechanisms interact with wide 
variations in context might be best left to evidence synthesis rather than each individual evaluation 
study.[49, 50]  
 
Do trials embody a unity of methods between the natural and social sciences? 
 
RCTs may appear vulnerable to this charge because they are a design also used in natural sciences 
such as agriculture and pharmacology.[51] However, as we saw from the philosophy of science 
literature on positivism, unity of method applies not at the level of a particular research design but 
at the level of an overall approach to science. So the question should be, do RCTs serve a form of 
social science that is exclusively focused on statistical associations like agricultural or 
pharmacological trials, or can social science RCTs include distinctive elements? 
 
RCTs, as we have already discussed, clearly do examine statistical associations between measured 
phenomena as one way of considering the plausibility of theories of causation. As mentioned earlier 
we chose the RCT of the CDP as an example because of its potential for adhering to some positivist 
tenets. The CDP trial involved no qualitative research aiming to understand the perspectives, 
motivations or agency of those involved in delivering or receiving the intervention. Although the trial 
involved interviews with the children participating in the programme, these interviews focused 
solely on structured assessments of their cognitive social problem solving and pro-social resolution 
skills. [18] 
 
However, many RCTs of social interventions such as those of the ASSIST and INCLUSIVE interventions 
also collect qualitative data.[22, 23] Qualitative analyses ongoing in the INCLUSIVE trial draw on 
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interviews and focus groups to explore how those involved with the intervention described the 
context of implementation, the meaning of the intervention for them, their agency and decisions in 
delivering or receiving the intervention, and the consequences of these decisions.[52] Like many 
contemporary process evaluations, this was guided by a sociological framework which sensitized 
evaluators to the ways in which local actors make sense of interventions, commit to using them, 
work collaboratively with others to draw on intervention resources to act and then reflect critically 
on these processes to inform choices about subsequent actions.[53, 54].  
 
Trials like those of ASSIST and INCLUSIVE that include such components are thus not merely aiming 
to generate information about statistical associations but are also aiming to understand action in 
terms of meanings and agency, very much in the hermeneutic tradition of Max Weber. Findings from 
qualitative research can be used in different ways within RCTs.[55] They might be compared with 
quantitative results to contribute towards assessing the plausibility of causation or, as is the case in 
the INCLUSIVE trial, be used to refine theories delineating context-mechanism-outcome 
configurations prior to hypotheses arising from these being tested using quantitative evidence from 
RCTs.[25, 56] Or qualitative research might be analysed separately to develop a deeper view of 
people’s experiences.[52] An example of this comes from the ASSIST RCT, in which qualitative data 
from teachers were used to understand some of the institutional barriers to implementation.[23] 
Qualitative data from students were used to explore how peer educators actively reinterpreted and 
reconstructed the intervention from one focused on prevention messages targeting the overall peer 
group, encompassing smokers and non-smokers, to one often restricted to providing information 
and targeting friends and predominantly those who have never smoked.[22] Thus, RCTs of social 
interventions can and do employ a multi-faceted approach which is distinctive from that of field 
trials of the biological effects of agricultural or pharmacological interventions.  
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While we have drawn on the work of Popper in the course of this paper to make the general case 
that an anti-positivist strand of thought has from the outset permeated social experimentation, 
Popper was in fact himself aligned with positivism on the specific question of the unity of method. 
He dismissed qualitative research as hopelessly unfocused in comparison to hypothetico-deductive 
science.[57] But here we depart from Popper in that we believe that qualitative research which 
collects data in the form of participants’ own accounts of their understandings and actions, and the 
consequences of these, can be crucial in helping social scientists refine their theories of how social 
mechanisms operate.[58] Adopting a realist rather than a positivist approach provides an 
appropriate framework for drawing on both quantitative and qualitative research because realist 
social science aims to explore cause and effect but also meaning and agency. As Blaikie suggests: 
 
“Social objects cannot be studied in the same way as natural objects, but they can be 
studied ‘scientifically’ as social objects… social reality is pre-interpreted, … society is both 
produced and reproduced by its members and is therefore both a condition, and an 
outcome of their activity. The social sciences have a subject-subject relationship to their 
subject matter rather than a subject-object one characteristic of the natural sciences… 
[W]hile sharing Positivism’s desire for producing causal explanations and Interpretivism’s 
view on the nature of social reality, Realism argues for a view of science that is very different 
from either of these approaches.” (p. 59) 
 
Discussion  
 
The literature describing or criticizing RCTs of social interventions as positivist was not 
comprehensive and was in fact frequently inconsistent in defining what is meant by positivism. The 
literature on the philosophy of science provided a more consistent and comprehensive definition of 
positivism. It depicted this as involving a number of tenets: the epistemic primacy of direct sensory 
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information as the basis for scientific knowledge; the requirement that theoretical terms must 
equate with empirical terms; the aim of developing universally applicable laws; and the unity of 
method between the natural and social sciences.  
 
Our review of current practice in RCT research focused on social interventions in public health and 
health services suggests a mixed picture. It is very difficult to see how RCTs embody the epistemic 
primacy of sensory information. Instead RCTs appear to embrace Karl Popper’s anti-positivist 
hypothetico-deductive approach to enquiry. Many RCTs appear to accept implicitly the requirement 
that theoretical terms are limited to those that are empirically measureable, for example by having 
logic models that are little more than strings of variables. However, RCTs are also now being done 
that do employ more sophisticated theories of change, engaging with the deeper sociological 
mechanisms by which social interventions operate. Even if not all aspects of these mechanisms are 
directly measured in the realm of the ‘actual’ they are nonetheless useful in formulating how 
causality actually operates in the realm of the real and therefore in informing more nuanced 
hypotheses to examine empirically. The picture is mixed as to whether those doing and synthesizing 
RCTs see their role as producing universal or contextually contingent generalisations. Although there 
is a tendency among many evidence producers and synthesisers to view their role as limited to the 
production of statistical trends as a form of generalization, this is not an inevitable feature of all RCT-
based research. The work of Karl Popper is again instructive, suggesting the need to generalize on 
the basis not of trends but of theory that specifies what contextual contingencies will influence the 
way in which mechanisms generate outcomes. While RCTs might appear to embody a unity of 
scientific method in that they are also applied in some natural sciences, there are in fact important 
divergences. In many cases, trials of social interventions use distinctive methods that would never be 
used in the natural sciences, such as hermeneutically inclined qualitative research aiming to 
understand how interventions are interpreted and enacted locally. 
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We have provided suggestions for how RCTs can move beyond residual features of a positivist 
paradigm by: focusing on the refinement and testing of theory concerning intervention mechanisms 
and the contextual contingencies affecting how these generate outcomes; examining not only 
overall effect sizes but also how these vary by context in order to test the plausibility of theory; 
accepting that generalizations are tentative and in the form of theories not merely statistical trends; 
and taking a distinctly social science approach to trials which embraces qualitative data on 
participants’ meanings and experiences alongside quantitative data on statistical associations. 
 
Our suggestions for the non-positivist conduct of social experiments draw heavily on the work of Karl 
Popper. Popper’s work is useful not only in providing suggestions for how to do social 
experimentation better, but also in illustrating that a non-positivist approach is not a recent attempt 
to redeem trials but in fact permeates the intellectual roots of RCTs. However, in our enthusiasm for 
using qualitative research within RCTs, we depart from Popper who dismissed the value of open-
ended research and inductive analysis in building or refining scientific or social scientific theory. We 
believe that the most appropriate paradigm for RCTs of social interventions is realism. Karl Popper’s 
brand of post-positivism and critical realism are united in viewing a world replete with causal 
mechanisms independent of our perceptions. Both also view human knowledge as an indirect 
representation of the world, and one that is infused with theory, fallible and provisional. Both 
recognize that positivism is redundant but reject the relativistic suggestions that no reality exists 
independent of our senses or that we cannot rationally judge between competing truth claims.[59] 
Although some realists appear to view realism and ‘post-positivism’ as rival paradigms,[35] like the 
co-formulator of the principles of realist evaluation, we regard realism as the pre-eminent post-
positivist paradigm, and one that rejects both the crude empiricism and determinism of positivism 
while maintaining a commitment to developing empirically informed accounts of causal processes in 
a real world.[60]  
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Conclusion 
We hope we have demonstrated, as requested by our realist critics, that RCTs are not inherently 
aligned with a positivist philosophical position.  
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